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Heterogeneity of public utility services is common in 
developing countries. In a “high-level” equilibrium, the 
quality of utility services is high, consumer willingness to 
pay for services is high, the utility is well funded and staff 
well paid in order to induce high quality of performance. 
In a “low-level” equilibrium the opposite is the case. 
Which alternative occurs depends on both the quality of 
utility management, and public perceptions about service 
quality. If a utility administration has the potential to 
offer high-quality service, and the public is aware of 
this, high-quality equilibrium also requires the public’s 
service payments to be high enough to fund the needed 
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pay incentives for the utility staff. When the public lack 
knowledge about the utility administration’s quality, the 
public’s initial beliefs about the utility administration’s 
quality also will influence their willingness to make 
adequate service payments for a high-quality equilibrium. 
This paper shows that, with low confidence, only a low-
level equilibrium may exist; while with higher initial 
confidence, a high-level equilibrium become possible. 
“Intermediate” (in between the low- and high-level) 
outcomes also can occur in early periods, with “high-
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1.  Introduction 
     This paper presents a theoretical framework for analyzing some key issues related to urban 
public utility services in developing and emerging economies, with specific reference to Latin 
America,  South  Asia,  and  Africa.  The  allocation  problems  for  utility  services  including 
household water and electricity access and service, encountered these regions are threefold: 1) 
Low service quality levels for households covered by the regular system. Water or electricity 
service  is  often  provided  only  during  part  of  the  day  or  sometimes  not  at  all  (including 
frequent outages); water may have low quality or pressure, and power may have incorrect and 
variable voltage. 2) Low coverage levels of households, with many households not having 
access to regular service, and where those without access must rely on other more expensive 
and less reliable sources. 3) Inadequate long-run overall supply (of water and electricity).  
     Water and electricity supply are crucial services in many developing countries. Surveys 
have shown that water service improvement is the most important public-service issue for 
urban residents in many developing countries.
1 While piped water access is now high in Latin 
America, in many cities 20-40 % of the urban population still lacks such access, and service is 
inferior to many, only during part of the day or by having low water pressure. Estache et.al. 
(2000) find that providing piped water  and electricity access, in addition to increasing the 
level of welfare directly, may significantly  raise   real  household income  in many  Latin 
American countries  e.g. by freeing time for market work or educ ation among household 
participants.
2  This  implies  the  potential  for  enormous  ove rall  welfare  gains   from 
improvements in these areas, in both the short and long run. The situation may be even worse 
in Africa and South Asia, where coverage rates for tap water and electricity are lower, and 
                                                 
1 An example is Tegucigalpa, Honduras, where almost 25 % of surveyed households (in 1995) rated water issues 
as the single most important issue, with sewerage service as a distant number 2 (at about 10 %). 
2 Overall, their estimates indicate that the resulting increase in household income is approximately 10 % from 
water access alone, although the figure is uncertain due to possible selection problems. See also Estache et al 
(2006).  
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other public goods such as roads of lower quality. In India, surveys reveal that overwhelming 
majorities of respondents cite either water or other local infrastructure as the top problem for 
their village.
3 This is in  spite of infrastructure spending having a much lower priority than 
other spending categories (including education), with lower attention by households.
4  
     My discussion in the following focuses on the first two of the three mentioned  problem 
areas, as applied to short- and medium run local-level water and power administration issues, 
with emphasis on the first (supply quality) area at least in the formal model. The two other 
problems are also important, but are more long-run issues requiring model set-ups that are 
alternative to that adopted here. The problem of long-run supply can also, arguably, often be 
viewed as outside of the direct control of  local-level water and power administrations. In 
many cases investments in system expansion are undertaken according to central-level plans, 
and largely funded by outside sources (central-government budgets, or donors). A failure in 
this area can consequently often be viewed less as a failure of local administrations, than that 
of higher bodies. 
     This exercise has two main objectives. The first is to achieve a better basic understanding 
of main implications of particular institutions on water and electricity sector performance, and 
how incentives work within such institutions, which are are essential for identifying possible 
fruitful reforms of the sector.  In the view of this author, n o satisfactory such theoretical 
framework exists to date. I here seek to provide such a framework.  This is also needed as a 
starting  point  for  empirical  analysis  of  urban  water ,  sewerage  and  electricity  sector 
performance, by identifying key parameters to be quantified, and providing interpretations of 
estimated parameters.  
     The  second  and  related  (and  more  specific)  objective  is  to  explore  the  theoretical 
possibility of simultaneous existence of   ”low-level” and ”high-level” equilibria in markets 
                                                 
3 See e g Besley (2004), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Banerjee et al (2007). 
4 See Khemani (2010).  
 
  4 
for public utility services in developing and emerging economies. The distinction between 
these two types of equilibria, and an understanding of the possibility of their simultaneous 
occurrence,  are  in  my  view  keys  to  understanding  the  functioning  of  such  markets.  The 
dichotomy between a “low-level” and a “high-level” equilibrium has been pointed out by a 
number of authors and applies to a variety of such markets, in the developing (as well as 
developed) world.
5 In the current jargon, a ”low-level” equilibrium denotes a situation where 
performance is low in most respects: service quality and coverage are low, the service utility 
has  low  net  revenues,  and  there  are  severe  organizational  inefficiencies  and  incentive 
problems,  with  few  incentives  to  maintain  existing  facilities  or  improve  services.  This 
constitutes an ”equilibrium” in the sense that no inherent forces tend to change the current 
state.
6 A ”high-level” equilibrium by contrast implies higher service quality and coverage, 
higher revenues to the utility, and greater intrinsic incentives for maintaining and improving 
the  system.  In  such  an  equilibrium,  a  high  level  of  service  is  supported  by  high  public 
willingness  to  pay  for  the  same  services,  and  where  the  public  recognizes  this  positive 
relationship between service payment and quality. A main objective of this analysis is to 
provide a basis for understanding the circumstances under which a ”low-level” equilibrium 
can be an outcome of particular institutional arrangements, where the prior history of the 
utility can play a major part in perpetuating a particular (often inefficient) solution. This leads 
to a next natural question, namely, what are the conditions that make it possible to break out 
of  an  initial  ”low-level”  equilibrium,  and  instead  move  toward  a  higher-level  and  more 
efficient solution.  
                                                 
5 See the general discussion related to water markets in Central America in Walker et.al. (1999). For the 
Honduran case, see here also Strand (2000). Singh et.al. (1993), and Altaf et.al. (1993) discuss similar issues for, 
respectively, India and Pakistan. 
6 Note that I do little in the paper to explain why the “low-level” equilibrium arises in the first place; my main 
concern is to explain why such a situation can be sustained as an equilibrium once having arisen. Following 
Bardhan (2006), factors conducive to such an initial situation are 1) a “weak state” whereby government 
commitment to long-run policies is difficult; and 2) a lack of a broad range of credible instruments for income 
redistribution, making redistribution via low commodities prices virtually the only option.   
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     In the formal analysis I am less concerned with the issue of public versus private utility 
administration,  but  rather  “high-quality”  versus  “low-quality”  utility  management.  High-
quality management is taken to mean that service delivery responds positively to economic 
incentives  provided  via  higher  prices  of  utility  services.  Under  low-quality  utility 
management, by contrast, service quality does not respond to price incentives. In principle, a 
publicly-run  utility  could  be  of  high  quality  and  a  private-run  utility  of  low  quality;  the 
opposite constellation is however more customary to face, and to assume.  
     At least equally important for this story is however the public’s perception of whether 
future service delivery quality can be expected to be “high” or “low”. In many cases, the 
public  has  incomplete  information  on  which  to  judge  the  quality  of  a  given  utility 
administration. This, I argue, can be crucial in (at least) two main situations: when the utility 
is initially stuck in a low-level equilibrium; and when the utility’s management is in a process 
of change. The key to multiple equilibria (where both high-level and low-level equilibria exist 
simultaneously for given economic fundamentals) can be found just here: pessimistic beliefs 
may be self-perpetuating; while optimistic beliefs may break an evil circle of “low-quality” 
equilibria.  
     In my model I assume that a utility administration can provide service at a “basic” level, or 
in excess of this “basic” level, but that the latter requires the ability to induce staff to put up 
excess effort (above a minimum), through a system of incentive (bonus) payments. I assume 
that when only a minimum price is paid for the service, only a minimum productivity level is 
implemented, regardless of administration quality. When income recovery is above minimum, 
incentives can be provided through bonuses, given that the quality of the utility administration 
is high (it is “non-corrupt”). When the utility administration has low quality (is “corrupt”), I 
assume that pay does not affect service delivery. I also assume that the price charged for 
utility services is decided in a public decision-making process (possibly, voting), and is set by  
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the public on the basis of an anticipated relationship between price and service quality. I first 
explore how such a relationship between pay and service quality may lead to either a “low-
level” or a “high-level” equilibrium, or possibly the co-existence of both. I then go on to 
demonstrate that when the public is uncertain about the true type of the utility administration 
(whether it is “corrupt” or “non-corrupt”), the utility market described by my model tends to 
exhibit multiple equilibria, in the sense that a “low-level” (“high-level”) equilibrium obtains 
when the (Bayesian) prior probability of “non-corrupt” is low (high).  
     The issues I describe by my model are highly relevant for describing actual public utility 
markets in several world regions. One is Latin America, where a great wave of regulatory 
changes has swept over the region largely in the electricity and telecommunications sectors 
but increasingly in water and sanitation. This has largely taken the form of privatization, so 
far more in telecommunications and power than in water and sanitation.
7 In the latter sectors 
public operation is however still often the most realistic alternative.  
     Another region where endemic inefficiency problems in both the electric power and water 
sectors take similar forms is South Asia. A main case in point is the market for electricity to 
households and farmers in India. This market is plagued by a chronic “low-level equilibrium” 
where willingness to pay for electricity supply is low (often zero at the margin for farmers, 
and typically determined at the state level through a political process), service quality is poor 
with frequent power outages and voltage distortions (leading to damaged equipment), and 
there are large system losses.
8 Surveys have indicated substantial willingness to pay for more 
reliable service, which could also raise more revenue so as to solve some of the problems) . 
There  is  however a  lack  of  political  will to increase  electricity  prices  in  part because 
consumers do not trust the power utilities to actually deliver higher -quality services. The 
                                                 
7 See Estache, Foster and Wodon (2000) for an early discussion and overview of privatization of utilities in Latin 
America over this period, and World Bank (2009) for a more recent discussion, covering all basic utility 
services.  
8 Such issues are discussed e g in World Bank (2010).  
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potential,  and  reachable,  “high-level  equilibrium”  is  thus  then  not  reached,  and  due  to 
processes very similar to those invoked in my model.
9  
     To my knowledge, no satisfactory and directly comparable analysis of multiple equilibra in 
infrastructure delivery markets currently exists in the literature. My model still relates rather 
closely to various supporting strands of literature. One is the literature on more general “low-
level” equilibrium in developing countries; see Nelson (1956) for a seminal contribution. The 
“entrapment” mechanisms are similar in my model and his, namely an inadequate level of 
funds to free the economy from the trap (in Nelson for investment; here for rewarding utility 
staff to take effort). But there are also more substantive differences, in particular when the 
“trap” in my model has an informational basis, as I discuss in section 5. Then escaping the 
“trap” is in a real economic sense easier here; and, arguably a more natural basis for the 
notion  of  multiple  equilibria  (for  given  fundamental  values)  is  achieved.  Another  related 
strand  of  literature  deals  with  centralization  versus  decentralization  of  utility  services;  a 
prominent example is Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006).
10 A focus in their paper, similar to 
ours, is on the potentially positive relationship between the ability to implement user fees, and 
service delivery, which they argue is   more likely to be successful under a decent ralized 
system,  in  particular  since   asymmetric  information  problems,  and  ten sions  related  to 
potentially adverse distributional impacts of service user  charges, then are minimized. To 
connect my model to theirs, note that a  system with gradually higher user payments in my 
model can in principle be interpreted as one with gradually  greater local autonomy and less 
central control  in theirs  (considering a system where the balance of utility revenues are 
obtained from central funds).  
 
                                                 
9 A similar but slightly less dire situation exists in the household power sector in India, where the norm also is 
under-pricing, poor supply quality, and an anemic rate of system expansion. 
10 For further discussion and elaboration of such issues, see Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005), and World Bank 
(2003).   
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2. Basics 
     Consider the following basic model. A given group of served customers with “regular 
service”
11 have the following utility function related to their utility services: 
(1)                                                      ( , ) ( ) U q W qV W pW  . 
U is net welfare to the customers (“the public”) from the utility service, W is the amount of 
the good provided (which could be water as our main example, or electricity), V is a “basic 
utility function” (in “basic water”, or “basic electricity”), q is a “quality outcome” variable for 
the public, that takes a minimum value of unity, and p is the price charged by the utility per 
unit of the good delivered. We assume that q is a function, q(E), of utility employee and 
management effort, E, so that q(0) = 1, while q’(E) > 0, q’’(E) < 0 throughout. We assume 
that V is increasing and strictly concave in W.  
     Consider initially that both p and q are given, at “basic” levels: q = 1, while p is some 
minimum price required for recovery of the utility’s basic operating cost. Assume that the 
utility has a (minimum) initial staff of size N, where each is paid a minimum unit salary, and 
assume that the utility has a fixed per-period capital cost of C. The total minimum per-period 
short-run cost of the utility is then SC(0) = N. But, I assume, this does not service any of the 
utility’s current capital costs, denoted C, and would thus result in a deficit being accumulated 
given that these costs are not serviced. Define minimum total costs by TC(0) = N+C (where 
the “zero” denotes that total costs are minimized).  
     We can think of this in two ways. First, we could assume that this deficit is simply being 
accumulated and the water utility is falling farther and farther into debt. The other, and more 
reasonable,  possibility  is  that  an  additional  accumulated  deficit  is  covered  (“bailed  out”) 
through alternative funding.
12  
                                                 
11 By this we here simply mean that, in the case of electricity or water, they are actually connected to the 
standard (power or tap) delivery system. 
12 Funding sources for long-run capital cost service could be general (local or central) taxation; the central 
government budget; or donors.  
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     Either  way,  start  by  assuming  that  the  utility  is  responsible  only  for  short-run  cost 
recovery. Assume that the number of regular customers is M. Then the basic price of water 
per  unit,  that  exactly  covers  the  utility’s  cost  (and  is  the  minimum  necessary  price  for 
operation) equals SC(0)/M = p(0). At this cost, the average household would select (vote in 
favour of) a level of W so as the maximize (1) (assuming that W is metered and subject to 
marginal pricing), yielding the following first-order condition solving for W: 
(2)                                                              '( ) (0) V W p  . 
Consider a quadratic V function: 




V W aW bW   
For this case, the optimal W and V(W) are: 

















Define also per-unit utility of the service by v(W), which is given by 









For (1) to be meaningful, U(q(0), W(0)) > 0, requiring the last constraint in (6) to hold. 
     The above solution may be considered as an “equilibrium”, in two different situations. In 
the first, there is no available alternative (or the public perceives no such). In the second, there 
are available alternatives but they are (viewed as) inferior to the low-level “status quo”.   
 
3. Endogenizing q with High-Quality- Utility Management 
3.1 Locally optimal q for low- (L) and intermediate-efficiency (M) solutions, 1 < p < p*. 
     I will now seek to endogenize the parameter q, the “quality” of service delivery. When the 
water price p is kept at the basic level of p(0), there is no surplus by which to reward good  
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service  that  could  raise  q  above  zero.  I  will  consider  mechanisms  by  which  q  can  be 
determined, endogenously and above the minimum level of unity, when p can be raised above 
the basic level of unity, and the service utility management can take on either of two different 
types: non-corrupt, and corrupt.  
     Assume a high-quality (“non-corrupt) service utility. Funding, through higher a p > 1 will 
then go toward either service improvements, or  increased servicing of existing debt, or a 
combination of the two. Assume that these take the form  that utility  employees  are paid 
bonuses  (beyond  a  basic  compensation  of  unity).  Assume  in  the  following  here  that  the 
amount of water sold is a constant (and equal to the optimal amount given p = 1, from (4)). 
Then an increase in the unit price will lead to a proportional increase in utility revenue.  
     When the utility however recovers more cost, some part of capital costs are assumed to be 
serviced out of user fees. Assume that when a higher price is charged for water, a fraction α is 
used toward higher pay for staff, and a fraction 1-α used for servicing of the debt.  
     Assume, alternatively, that the service utility could be corrupt.  I will assume that low 
service quality (or “corruption”) takes the form that, regardless of additional funding through 
excess  water  price,  service  will  not  improve.  This  money  now  instead  disappears  in  the 
pockets of utility management and staff.
13 
     We will in this section concen trate on the  “non-corrupt”  case.  For  this  case  we  can 
formulate  a  function  relating  higher  payments  of  the  public  per  unit  of  water,  to  service 
quality in the form of higher values of the quality parameter q. The wage of staff, w, is then 
determined from (as long as not all capital costs are yet paid) 
(7)                                                       ( 1) ( 1) p W w N      
                                                 
13 Alternatively, service quality could be only a very weakly increasing function of unit price in this case. A 
number of such examples can be found.One case  is the water utility administration, SANAA, in Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, during the 1990s. Being initially stuck in a “low-level” equilibrium, there was on a few occasions 
attempts to raise water prices in order to improve service levels. On those occasions, however, the SANAA 
employee union was able to capture virtually the entire increased cash flow to SANAA, without any noticeable 
service improvements taking place. For further discussion of this case, see Strand (2000).   
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where w(0) = 1 is a minimum wage to be paid to utility staff. Service of capital costs, γC, are 
correspondingly given by the fraction 1-α of excess water revenue: 
(8)                                                     (1 )( 1) p W C      
which holds up to the upper limit for γ (= 1). This occurs when p reaches the level 





   

 
where we have set c = C/W. c can be interpreted as the ratio of capital costs to minimum or 
basic labor costs in the public utility’s budget. Alternatively, c is the ratio of capital costs to 
the utility’s gross receipts from the public at the minimum price (= 1).  
     Any increase in p beyond its level given by (9) is expended toward higher wages and 
bonuses to staff. From (6) we now have the following relationship between the wage of utility 
staff, w, and the price paid by customers, p, as follows: 








Let us now normalize further and set p(0) = 1, which in turn implies W = N. Assuming still 
that W is a constant given by (4), we can then write (10) in the following simplified way, 
given that 1 < p ≤ p*: 
(10a)                                                        1 ( 1) wp     , 
or when written inversely, as the price as function of the wage: 
 
(11)                                                       
1
( 1 ) pw 

    
     Consider now incentives of water utility staff to put up effort to improve on the delivered 
service quality parameter q. We assume that management of the water utility can reward  
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employees according to q (which is assumed to be publicly observable), according to a linear 
payoff function of the following type:
14 
(12)                                       (0) ( (0)) 1 ( 1) w w q q q        , 
where  w(0)  = 1 is  the  base (minimum) wage,  and where β  indicates the “power” of the 
incentive  mechanism  (or  the  degree  to  which  reward  depends  on  measurable  outcome). 
Define now the following objective function for utility staff: 
(13)           
22 11
( , ) ( 1) ( 1) 1 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
22
F w q w g q h q q g q h q              , 
where we assume that producing at level q = 1 implies no (incentivizable) effort (= the level 
of  effort  put  up  by  showing  up  for  work).  The  disutility  of  putting  up  effort  q  toward 
improving utility services is, I assume in (13), a quadratic function of measurable-outcome 
effort. Maximizing (13) with respect to q yields 






     The three equations (14), (11) and (12) can be viewed as having four unknowns, w, p, q 
and β. We can then, from this set of equations, define w, q and β as functions of p. One 
interpretation of this solution is that p is “chosen” by the public, recognizing this relationship. 
We are, in particular, concerned with the relationship between q and p, which is decisive for 
the public’s possible choice of output price of the utility. We find the following equation 
relating these two variables (when eliminating 1 and β): 
(15)                                                ( 1 )( 1) ( 1) hq g q p       . 
A meaningful solution to (14) (requiring a solution values q, p ≥ 1) requires that the constraint 
(16)                                                              1 gh   
holds. Solving the quadratic equation (15) for q in terms of p we find: 
                                                 
14 There could here still be an incentive problem versus each individual employee if what is observed is only the 
aggregate output and efficiency level of the utility and not the individual-employee contribution to this level. We 
here ignore such problems by simply assuming that individual-specific mechanisms can be established.   
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(17)                                    
2 1 ( 1) 4 ( 1)
2
h g h g h p
q
h
       
  
We also have the following schedule between q and p, from (15): 
(18)                                                     
21
dq





It is easily seen that (for q, p ≥ 1) dq/dp > 0, so that this schedule is increasing, but less 
rapidly when q increases beyond 1.  
     Consider now possible (locally) optimal, internal solutions for p on the domain [1, p*]. 
These must be characterized by the optimal choice of p considering the relationship between p 
and q given from (18). The utility function of the representative consumer, U, can now be 
found by assuming that the level of water W from (4) applies, giving the following solution 
for V(W), found from (3), as 









This yields the following expression for net utility: 
(20)                                           
11
( ) ( )
2
aa
U W q p p
b
   

. 
In  (20),  we  consider  q  a  function  of  p  given from  (15)  (or alternatively  from  (18)).  The 
relationship between U and p can then be written as: 





dp b hq g h
  
     
. 
There are here three possible classes of optimal solutions: a) dU/dp < 0 (the “optimal” q is 
less than unity); b) dU/dp = 0 (we have an internal, optimal, solution); and c) dU/dp > 0 for 
permissible q and p (the optimal solution lies in the range p > p*).  
     Consider first case b), the internal solution, where (21) is set equal to zero. This yields the 
following solution for q (= qM; indicating a “medium-level” value of q):   
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(22)                                               
11







       

. 
Most importantly here, we see that the solution value for qM from (22) is greater than unity if 
and only if 







   . 
The schedule by which staff pay increases when receipts from utility fees rise, must here have 
a certain minimum positive slope. Thus, a (local) internal solution for q on [1, q*] exists in 
this case, if and only if (23) holds.  
     β  indicates  the  power  of  the  incentive  scheme  used  to  induce  effort  among  utility 
employees, and is endogenously determined as follows: 






      

. 
(24) indicates that the incentive scheme is more “powerful” when α (the fraction of excess 
payments that can be used for incentivizing utility employees) is higher. One must however 
be careful in interpreting this parameter, as it is the resulting q level that is key:  If either of 
the parameters g and/or h is too high (so that (23) does not hold), no equilibrium with p > 1 
exists, regardless of the solution value for β.  
 
3.2 Locally optimal q for high-efficiency (H) solutions, p > p* 
     Consider next cases where a locally optimal solution can entail p > p* (given from (9)). In 
this case w is given by  
(25)                                        1 ( * 1) * w p p p p c         . 
Note that we are focusing on local optimality: we do not rule out the possibility that an M 
solution is globally optimal. The only difference from the discussion in section 3.1 is that,  
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instead of (10a), (25) determines the wage-price relationship. The relationship between q and 
p is now characterized by 
(26)                                            ( 1 )( 1) 1 hq g q p c        
The values of q relevant here are in excess of q* (which correspond to p in excess of p* given 
from (9)), where q* is given by 
(27)                                  









            
I now derive a relation between q and p, holding for (q, p) > (q*, p*), in similar fashion as 
under the M case, obtaining the relationship 
(28)                                                ( 1 )( *) * hq g q q p p      . 
The solution for q is now 
(29)                                 
2 1 * ( * 1) 4 ( *)
2
hq g hq g h p p
q
h
      
  
The slope of the q-p schedule is in this case, for q > q*: 








This slope is steeper than that implied by (17), for an M solution. Thus, the overall schedule 
between q and p has a “kink” at the point (p*, q*). This is the point beyond which all capital 
cost is serviced, and the entire excess marginal revenue can be expended toward staff pay 
service quality improvements.  
     (20) still holds as the expression for U(W). Maximizing (20) with respect to p invoking 
q(p) from (30) now yields 
(31)                                       
1 1 1
10
2 2 * 1
dU a a
dp b hq g hq
 
       
 
with the following solution for q (= qH; a “high” value):   
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(32)                                                
11




q q h g
h
       

 
I here find that, for a candidate H equilibrium to be found, a key condition is qH > q*, where 
qH is given from (32), and q* given from (27).   
 
4. Equilibrium under Complete Information and High-Quality Government 
     I will now study possible overall equilibria for this market, and focus on the case where the 
utility administration is non-corrupt, and this is common knowledge among residents. The 
model  is  also  assumed  to  be  common  knowledge,  so  that  the  public  knows  the  true 
relationship  between  p  and  q.  Assume  that  the  utility  price  is  determined  through  public 
voting over alternatives, leading to the preferred level. It remains to check which solution, 
among the candidates found, is the actual equilibrium: p = 1 (low-level of L equilibrium); p 
on (1, p*] (medium-level or M equilibrium); or p > p* (high-level or H equilibrium). 
     For this problem to be interesting we must, as a minimum, assume the following condition 
(noting also that (16) must hold): 







    . 
From (6), (a+1)/2 > 1. The sum of the two parameters h+g must then be required to fall in a 
particular range, [1, (a+3)/2]. The upper limit of the range is the relevant constraint to focus 
on here. When this constraint fails, no equilibrium value for q exceeding 1 can ever be found, 
and  neither  an  M  nor  an  H  equilibrium  can  exist.  Intuitively,  when  h+g  is  large,  utility 
employees have a high degree of effort aversion.
15 No permissible incentive mechanism can 
then be constructed which is sufficiently powerful to induce effort q exceeding 1. 
     Assume in the  following that (33) holds. I will now first focus on  the more restrictive 
condition, (23), for an M equilibrium to exist, and assume that this holds, making the problem 
                                                 
15 On the other hand, when h+g is low, effort aversion is “too low” and an intermal maximization solution cannot 
be found; in this case the problem is not well defined with the given functional forms.  
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less trivial. We then have (at least) a candidate M equilibrium, as studied in section 3.1.
16 In 
such  cases  we  may  have  two  candidate  equilibria.
17  The  issue  is  t hen  whether  an  M 
equilibrium,  or  the  H equilibrium  alternative,  will be  chosen.  Note then first that an H  
equilibrium candidate can  be found only if qH > q* (with qH given from (32) and q* from 
(27)), following from the discussion in section 3.2.  
     Let us now define the constants A1 and A2 by: 
(34)                                                 12








Under the M equilibrium, utility can then be expressed as 
(35)                                  12
1
1 ( 1 )( 1) M M M M U Aq A hq g q

        
, 
where qM is given from (22). 
     Under the H equilibrium, utility is 
(36)                                    12 1 ( 1 )( 1) H H H H U Aq A c hq g q        , 
where qH is given from (32), and where we must have, as noted, qH > q*.  
     Under these conditions, an M (H) equilibrium will be the outcome given that UM > (<) UH.  
     It  is  here  crucial  to  compare  the  two  levels  of  utility  UM  and  UH.  In  making  this 
comparison, the magnitude of  c  is  seen to play  a major role,  and thus for the choice of 
equilibrium. Briefly expressed, when c is “very large”, UM > UH always. Intuitively, there is a 
lot of debt to be serviced in the short run.
18 The price p for utility services to be charged to the 
public,  that leads to full debt service out of variable user charges to the public, is exceedingly 
high; and an equilibrium incorporating such a price less attractive than o ne with a far lesser 
amount of debt service.  
                                                 
16 Note again that (33) is not sufficient for an M equilibrium candidate to exist; the stronger condition (23) must 
hold.  
17 This should be clear also from the simulations below. 
18 We see however, of course, also that when c is very large, we cannot have  
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     By contrast, when c = 0, there is no debt to be serviced, and all excess revenue can go 
toward staff compensation “from the first dollar”. In this case, the intermediate M solution 
disappears. An H equilibrium then always exists, by virtue of assumption (33). 
     In intermediate cases for c, both solutions can be relevant. A more detailed comparison of 
utility levels is needed. Note however that, by continuity, there exists a level of c, call it c*, 
that makes UM = UH. Thus for c < (>) c*, an M (H) equilibrium will result under complete 
information. 
     The simulations in figures 1-2 below illustrate the shape of the (p, q) schedule for two 
alternative values of α, namely 0.2, and 0.5.
19 In the former case (figure 1) “most” of the 
excess payment to the utility (above 1) goes for servicing debt, and only a fraction 0.2 is 
allocated to staff incentive payments. The (quality, price) schedule is then relatively flat up to 
the point where debt is fully serviced, while it rises at a much steeper rate for higher p levels. 
It is then easy to see that the shape of indifference curves (which will be rising and strictly 
convex in (p, q) space) will determine which of the two segments corresponds to the optimal 
solution for the public. Note also that a special case may entail where the highest indifference 
curve is tangent to both segments. In such a special case, there are two distinct equilibria in 
this model, for given fundamentals.  
     In figure 2, a larger fraction of excess revenue goes to staff. This implies a more rapidly 
rising (p, q) schedule, but a higher p is required before debt is serviced (and all excess pay 
may go to staff). This also implies that the kink is less noticeable. 
                                                 
19 In the case simulated, I have set h = g = 1, c = 2.  
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Figure 1: Illustration of the (p, q) schedule for α = 0.2 
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5. Bayesian Equilibria With Incomplete Information About the Utility’s Type 
5.1 qM is the complete information equilibrium 
     I have above assumed that the utility administration can be either low-quality (“corrupt”) 
or  high-quality (“non-corrupt”). The analytical derivations in sections 2-4 were however all 
based on the assumption that the utility administration is non-corrupt, and that this is common 
knowledge among the public. In that case, I found that equilibrium is typically unique (apart 
from in special cases), and can be either an L, M or H equilibrium. Which equilibrium will 
result, depends on certain parameters of our model; on “economic fundamentals”.  
     I now consider possible outcomes when the nature of this administration is not necessarily 
known to the public, but must be predicted or anticipated, under uncertainty. In the context of 
my model, there are (at least) two natural contexts in which the utility administration’s type 
may not be fully known among the public. First, if history up to the particular point in time 
studied has been one involving only L outcomes, such outcomes cannot distinguish between 
types; thus the utility administration’s type would be non-observable.
20 Secondly, following a 
change in  the utility’s management, there may be uncertainty among the public about the 
quality of this management. 
     Following this line of argument, assume that the utility administration is non-corrupt, but 
that this fact is not (fully) known by the public. This implies incomplete information about 
utility administration type. We will represent this by introducing a parameter θ, which is the 
public’s (Bayesian) prior probability that the utility is non-corrupt, with a complementary 
probability 1-θ that the utility is corrupt, and such that 0 < θ < 1. For the public, the situation 
is that service delivery, in response to a particular price paid for the service, is considered to 
be uncertain.  
                                                 
20 In principle one could, for some time, have had a non-corrupt administration, which however had not been 
able to prove its quality due to minimum-level finance in past periods. 
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     We now focus on the possibility of an “M-type” equilibrium, where the welfare function of 
the public related to utility services is given by (20) in the complete information case. Assume 
qM  >  1  so  that  (23)  holds.  Ignoring  in  the  following  a  possible  H  equilibrium,  an  M 
equilibrium exists in the complete information case.  
     In  the  current  (incomplete  information)  case,  public  welfare  would  be  uncertain.  (19) 
would need to be replaced by the following expected welfare expression, where we can now 
write expected welfare to the public directly as a function of the price charged for utility 
services: 
(37)                                 
11
( ) ( ( ) 1 )
2
aa
EU p q p p
b

      

. 
     The problem for the public of selecting the optimal p would now amount to finding an 
equilibrium  to  the  associated  Bayesian  game,  where  the  public  takes  the  utility 
administration’s (state-contingent) optimal behaviour into consideration.
21 Maximizing EU(p) 
in (37) with respect to p now yields the following (short-run) optimal solution for q (denoted 
qθM to indicate its dependence on the given prior belief): 
(38)                                        
11







       

. 
A crucial issue is here whether qθM is smaller or greater than one. If qθM ≤ 1, the “low-level” 
equilibrium will persist as the chosen price will not be able to sustain a service quality level 
above the minimum. The utility administration’s true type will then not be revealed by the 
resulting market outcome. This holds whenever  












By contrast, when θ > θM, qθM > 1.  
                                                 
21 See Gibbons, chapter 3, for an introduction to Bayesian games. Note that the “game” here and in the following 
section is much simplified as the (type-dependent) strategy space of the utility administration is highly restricted: 
to produce at minimum level if corrupt; and at the response level from section 3 if non-corrupt.  
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(39) thus gives the cut-off level for θ: when θ > (≤) θM, an M (L) equilibrium will result under 
incomplete information, where θ is the public’s (Bayesian) prior probability that the utility 
administration is non-corrupt.  
     Once an M equilibrium has materialized for one period, the utility administration’s type 
will have been revealed. Upon observing the higher quality level qθM in this case, it will be 
immediately confirmed to the public that the quality of the utility administration is high (it is 
“non-corrupt”). The prior probability of non-corruption will then be immediately revised, so 
that θ = 1 from then on. In subsequent periods, the optimal solution will then be q = qM.   
     This  argument  leads  us  to  multiple  equilibria  for  given  fundamentals,  such  that  the 
equilibrium which actually materializes, emerges as a function of the public’s subjective prior 
probability of a non-corrupt utility administration, θ: For all prior beliefs θ ϵ [0, θ*], the low-
level equilibrium persists, with minimum levels of utility prices, and effort. For all priors θ ϵ 
(θ*, 1], by contrast, qθM is the equilibrium value of q in the first period, and qM in subsequent 
periods.  
 
5.2 qH is the complete information equilibrium 
     Consider  next  a  case  where  the  high-level  (H)  equilibrium  prevails  under  complete 
information. Let us then first simply assume that an H equilibrium (albeit with a different (p, 
q) combination) would prevail also in the incomplete information case.  
     (37)  would  still  describe  the  general  welfare  function  for  the  public  in  this  case.  The 
welfare maximizing solution for the M case, (38), would now be replaced by (denoting the 
solution for q by qθH in this case) 
(40)                                        
11







       

. 
In general, the solution for qθH is less than qH (possibly much less), due to θ < 1. This raises a 
number of issues.  
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     A key issue is whether qθH ≥ q*, from (27), which is still a condition for the H solution to 
materialize. This holds whenever 







   . 
Define a value of θ, call it θH, which yields equality in (41), and below which only an M 
equilibrium can exist. 
     Secondly, assume now qθH > q*, as found from (40). While this solution is locally optimal, 
it need not be globally optimal. This may be the case even when the H solution is globally 
optimal under complete information.  
     To  understand  this,  consider  the  profit  expressions  for  the  M  and  H  cases,  when 
information is incomplete (θ < 1). These expressions are respectively: 
(42)                                  12
1
1 ( 1 )( 1) M M M M U A q A hq g q     

        
 
for the M  case, with qθM is given from (38); and  
(43)                                    12 1 ( 1 )( 1) H H H H U A q A c hq g q              
for the H case with qθH given from (40). The difference in utility is given by 
(44)    12
1
( ) ( 1 )( 1) ( 1 )( 1) H M H M H H M M U U A q q A c hq g q hq g q         

              
 
We here see that as θ is reduced (and qθH and qθM at the same time fall), c does not fall and 
tends to dominate the expression more. As a result there is a tendency for (44) to be negative 
in more cases. An M solution will then be selected in “more cases” given that an H and an M 
solution are both feasible. 
     The conclusion of the discussion in this subsection is that, “often”, the selected equilibrium 
will take the following form: Whenever (39) holds, select qθM in the first period; select qH in 
subsequent periods given that qH > q* from (27).  
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6. Conclusions and Extensions 
     A  main  objective  of  this  paper  has  been  to  characterize  potential  “low-level”  (L)  and 
“high-level” (H) equilibria in markets for public utility services, with particular application to 
developing and emerging economies. In sections 2-4 of the paper I study the behaviour of a 
high-quality  (“non-corrupt”)  utility  service  administration,  and  where  there  is  common 
knowledge among the relevant public being served by this utility (information is symmetric). 
An important feature of my model is how the payment for services, in excess of a stipulated 
minimum price, affects incentives within the utility service administration. I assume that the 
basic (minimum) price covers the short-run costs of basic service provision (at a minimum 
quality level), but with no room for servicing any part of the utility’s capital costs. When the 
price paid by the public is increased, additional revenue is allocated to two different ends: a 
fraction α is spent on excess payments to utility staff; while the rest (a fraction 1-α) is spent to 
service the utility’s fixed capital costs (with a maximum such service of C). When the price p 
is above some higher level p*, capital costs are fully serviced by the fraction 1-α of such 
excess user charges. Additional revenue is then expended in its entirety toward management 
and staff salary and bonuses. I show that, under such a financing schedule for the utility and 
its  service,  and  when  the  utility  administration  is  non-corrupt  (and  this  is  common 
knowledge), three classes of equilibria may obtain: a) a “low-level” (L) equilibrium with low 
(only basic) service level and prices; b) an intermediate (M) equilibrium where price and 
service quality are both in an intermediate range; and c) a high-level (H) service equilibrium 
where the service price and quality are both higher and where, at the margin, all revenue from 
increased  service  payments  goes  toward  staff  remuneration.  Typically,  for  any  given 
parameter constellation, only one equilibrium exists. Overall, when C is “very small”, only an 
L or an H equilibrium can exist; and when C is “very large”, only an L or an M equilibria can  
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exist. In some special (non-generic) cases there may however exist two equilbria, both an M 
and an H equilibrium, for given parameter values.  
     When by contrast the quality of the utility administration is low (it is “corrupt”;and this is 
common knowledge; so there is still no information asymmetry), the L equilibrium is the 
unique equilibrium. This is because, in my model, the quality of service for a corrupt utility 
administration is not responsive to increased staff payments within the utility administration. 
There is then, obviously, no willingness to pay for utility service beyond the minimum, since 
such extra payment will in no case lead to improved service quality, and this is known to all.  
     Section 5 studies solutions with incomplete (asymmetric) information, where the quality 
(or “type”) of the utility administration is not fully known to the public. The true type, I 
assume, is  high-quality  (“non-corrupt”). The public attaches  a (Bayesian) subjective prior 
probability,  θ,  between  zero  and  unity,  to  the  utility  being  “non-corrupt”’  and  a 
complementary  probability,  1-θ,  to  it  being  “corrupt”.  I  argue  that  there  are  at  least  two 
plausible reasons for such an information asymmetry to exist. First, when society has been 
“stuck” in  a low-level  equilibrium for some time, the true utility type cannot  be directly 
observed by the public in my model. An L solution will then be perpetuated even when the 
true  type  is  “non-corrupt”.  Secondly,  occasional  changes  in  the  utility  administration  do 
occur. Sometimes these changes are drastic as when this administration undergoes a radical 
transformation  (from  public  to  private,  or  from  state-  to  locally-run,  operation).  In  this 
transition, there will be some natural uncertainty among the public, about how the utility is 
likely to perform. When the public is “myopic” (concerned with only one future “period”), a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting (incomplete information) game is then simple to 
characterize. First, when θ is below a particular threshold (θ*), the L equilibrium is the only 
equilibrium.  When  θ  >  θ*,  solutions  in  the  incomplete  information  case  depend  on  their 
complete information counterpart. Common to all such solutions is that the price p per unit of  
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utility  services  charged  to  utility  customers  in  the  “first  period”  will  be  higher  than  the 
minimum level p(0), but less than the  equivalent level under complete information. This 
yields a service level, q, which is above the minimum level of q(0), but below the level that 
would result under complete information. The utility administration’s type is then revealed as 
being non-corrupt in the “first period” (since, if the administration had been corrupt, it would 
not have been able to provide any increase of q above q(0)).  
     The analytical derivations in my model are based on the assumption that the public is 
concerned with only one future period when making its current policy choice, and that this 
choice  only  involves  the  willingness  to  pay  per  unit  of  utility  services,  p.  In  particular, 
information revelation as such (whereby the utility administration type could be revealed, but 
only if the public would set p above unity) was then of no particular concern for the public’s 
choice  of  p,  in  the  period  in  question.  In  short,  the  reason  for  this  is  that  information 
revelation as such would be of value for future periods only, not for the current period.  
     Some changes in assumptions, in realistic directions, would also change the nature of some 
of the results. Assume instead that the public is concerned with two (or more) periods instead 
of just the one single period ahead. This changes the game, and model, more fundamentally. 
Think, in particular, of a case where, in the complete information case, an M equilibrium 
would be selected, and where (23) thus holds. This problem has a simple solution when (33) 
holds, and is then identical to that discussed in section 5. The reason is that the solution from 
section  5  is  optimal  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  public,  both  for  period  2  (given  the 
information asymmetry in that period), and for subsequent periods (when there is no longer an 
information asymmetry). 
     When (33) does not hold, the system would be stuck in an L equilibrium in the single-
period case regardless of utility administration’s type. Adding more than one period over 
which the public maximizes its initial utility will however change this. The public may then  
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take action to raise p above unity in the first period in order to reveal information about the 
utility administration. This would add to the value of the service in the period. The threshold 
beyond which an M solution will be selected in the first period is then lowered. This effect is 
stronger when the future is longer relative to the current period.  
     A number of extensions of the current model could and should be pursued in future work. 
One is to extend my set-up so as to accommodate concerns raised when extending it to a 
repeated game, in a more satisfactory way by including public preferences for more than one 
period. This would require some basic changes of the model as presented so far. Two changes 
seem particularly relevant.  I have above made the unrealistic assumption that information 
revelation requires only a marginal increase in p beyond p(0). It is then always optimal to 
induce  such  revelation.  A  first  change  would  here  be  to  assume  that  a  certain  minimum 
increase in p is necessary for truthful revelation. A second (alternative or complementary) 
change would be to assume that q is a random function of p, so that truthful revelation may 
not be guaranteed even when the utility administration acts optimally and is non-corrupt. The 
latter may follow when service quality itself is stochastic. Then observable service quality 
might not improve even when utility employees put up high effort.
22 Alternatively, service 
quality may be observed to be “high” in some periods when effort is low.
23  
     Some other possibilities then also open up. One is where the utility administration, while 
inherently  “corrupt”,  tries  to  signal  being  “non-corrupt”.
24  An  incentive  compatibility 
constraint on the administration must then be fulfilled for truthful revelation to take place.
25  
                                                 
22 This could be the case if both aggregate demand and aggregate supply for the service in question are 
stochastic, and when high effort coincides with periods of exceptionally high demand, or exceptionally low 
supply. 
23 As when low effort coincides with exceptionally low general demand, or exceptionally high supply. 
24 Note that the utility administration will, quite generally, gain from such signaling in the context of our model, 
since it will be able to charge higher utility prices when it is perceived as non-corrupt, thus giving room for 
higher rent. From the theory of signaling (Spence (1974); see also Gibbons (1992), chapter 4), signaling costs 
must be sufficiently high to deter it, for a corrupt administration. 
25 Such an analysis would have its counterpart in the earlier literature on reputational equilibria for finite-period 
repeated games, as studied by Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and Baccus and Driffill 
(1985).   
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     As I noted in the introduction, my model of user-fee financing can be viewed as a “short-
hand” representation a more elaborate model. In such an extended model, it would ideally be 
desirable to specify additional detail such as the level of centralization; the more specific 
mechanism for funding (with the relative importance of user fees, local taxes, and different 
types of more central financing, and differentiated by income groups); the issue of public 
versus private ownership and operation; and further issues such as the possibility of capture 
by elites. Extending the model to accommodate such features will make it more realistic and 
rich, but also more complex. It would also be valauble to investigate whether any of these 
extensions also extend the scope for multiple-equilibrium outcomes. Such extensions would 
also  open  up  more  avenues  to  empirical  research  by  making  the  model  more  adept  to 
empirical investigation; a crucial issue not pursued here, but which be left for future research. 
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